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Retaliation, the fastest growing cause of action in discrimination law, has gained considerable attention, 
following two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The 2006 Supreme Court case, White v. 
Burlington Northern, and the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of 
Nashville has made retaliation front-page news. White created legal ambiguities that allow plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to posture and leave management lawyers without the tools to adequately render legal advice. 
Crawford expanded the opposition clause, which involves an employee’s resistance to a perceived 
violation of discrimination statutes. While there’s no indication that either case should result in more 
plaintiff victories (nor prevent employers from managing their workforce), the cases will, in all likelihood, 
lead to a further increase in claims. They also could change some management practices, despite 
causing no major changes in plaintiffs’ abilities to succeed in their claims. Following extensive discussion 
at the 2008 and 2009 Labor and Employment Law Roundtables, we conducted this analysis to examine 
the effects of the White and Crawford cases and explain the law surrounding retaliation. Before we 
address these issues, however, we examine the statistical increase in retaliation claims and hypothesize 
why these cases are on the rise. 
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ExEcutivE Summary
Retaliation: 
Why an Increase in Claims Does Not Mean 
the Sky Is Falling
by David Sherwyn and Gregg Gilman
T
wo decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court appear to open the door wide for employees to charge 
their employers with retaliation in connection with discrimination accusations. The Court 
expanded certain aspects of retaliation, which was already the fastest growing cause of action in 
discrimination law. Despite the Court’s rulings, however, no evidence shows that employee 
plaintiffs are more likely to be successful. In Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville the 
Supreme Court expanded the definition of opposition, which occurs when an employee resists or 
otherwise expresses disapproval of the actions of an employer or other employee. The Court decided 
that opposition could occur if the employee expresses disdain for a practice, even if he or she does not 
actually complain about it. In the other case, White v. Burlington Northern, the Court created a standard 
for retaliation that expands the proscribed employer actions taken in the wake of a discrimination 
claim. Burlington Northern moved White from one set of duties to another within her job description, 
but the Court determined that such an action might discourage an employee from filing a discrimination 
charge. Thus, the Court determined that the change constituted retaliation. Despite opening the 
retaliation gate wider and perhaps encouraging more employees to file a complaint, the Court has not 
necessarily made it easier for plaintiff employees to prevail. This analysis is an outcome of discussions 
at the 2008 and 2009 Labor and Employment Law Roundtables.
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cornEll hoSpitality rEport
Retaliation, the fastest growing cause of action in discrimination law, has gained considerable attention, following two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. The 2006 Supreme Court case, White v. Burlington Northern, and the 2009 Supreme Court decision in Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville has made retaliation 
front-page news. White created legal ambiguities that allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to posture and leave 
management lawyers without the tools to adequately render legal advice. Crawford expanded the 
opposition clause, which involves an employee’s resistance to a perceived violation of discrimination 
statutes. While there’s no indication that either case should result in more plaintiff victories (nor prevent 
employers from managing their workforce), the cases will, in all likelihood, lead to a further increase 
in claims. They also could change some management practices, despite causing no major changes in 
plaintiffs’ abilities to succeed in their claims. Following extensive discussion at the 2008 and 2009 Labor 
and Employment Law Roundtables, we conducted this analysis to examine the effects of the White and 
Crawford cases and explain the law surrounding retaliation. Before we address these issues, however, 
we examine the statistical increase in retaliation claims and hypothesize why these cases are on the rise.
Retaliation: 
Why an Increase in Claims Does Not Mean the Sky Is Falling
by David Sherwyn and Gregg Gilman
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The Increase in Retaliation Charges over Time
To gain a sense of the remarkable change in retaliation 
charges, let us first examine whether we can see any trends 
based on other causes, such as discrimination due to dis-
ability or age. As many readers know, employees may not file 
discrimination charges in federal court without first filing 
charges of discrimination with either the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or with an affiliated state 
agency (commonly referred to as “FEPA”). As a result of this 
requirement, tracking the percentages of lawsuits alleging 
violations of anti-discrimination employment statutes may 
be done by analyzing EEOC or FEPA charge filing statistics. 
In the 1980s and early 1990s the EEOC and state FEPAs 
received about the same number of charges each year. FEPA 
charge data are often difficult to find, but EEOC data are 
readily available. Those are the data we use here, regard-
ing enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Equal Pay 
Act. Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the 
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and gender. In 
the last thirteen years, total employment discrimination 
charges filed with the EEOC has ranged from a low of 72,000 
charges in 1992 to a high of 91,000 in 1994. In 2007, 82,792 
charges were filed.1 Because of this year-to-year fluctuation, 
1 See: EEOC.gov
using the raw numbers to evaluate which claims are most 
prevalent is not informative. Instead, we analyze the percent-
age change in claims filed per year. The largest single year-
to-year percentage change is Americans with Disabilities 
(ADA) claims filed in 1992 and 1993. Only 1.4 percent of 
the cases filed in 1992 were ADA cases, but that number ex-
panded to 17.4 percent in 1993. This jump is easily explained, 
because the ADA went into effect in July 1992. Beginning in 
1993 the ADA cases have made up between 17.4 percent and 
23.1 percent of EEOC filings. Besides disability, the greatest 
fluctuation in any claim based on a protected class was the 
7.2-percentage point differential of ADEA cases filed in 1992 
(27.1%) and the cases filed in 1995 (19.9%). In 2005, ADEA 
cases made up 22.0 percent of the total claims filed.2 These 
fluctuations may be the result of random variability. In any 
event, little in the way of trends can be discerned in these 
statistics. There is, however, one cause of action that exhib-
ited a dramatic increase that is clearly not random. That 
cause is retaliation.
In essence, a retaliation claim stems when an employee 
believes that an employer has acted against the employee in 
response to the employee’s claim on one of the other causes 
of action, including age or sex discrimination. In 1993, 
retaliation claims made up 15.3 percent of the total cases 
brought. By 2007, that percentage more than doubled to 
2 Id.
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discrimination, he or she can easily tack on a retaliation 
claim as part of the filing to establish the prima facie case.
In addition to these tack-on claims, employees can file 
allegations when they are not members of a protected class 
and when the only evidence of discrimination is the timing 
of an employers’ actions. In this instance, retaliation opens 
the door to a number of arguably less meritorious claims. 
Many management lawyers will argue that employees make 
frivolous complaints of discrimination to their employer as 
a temporary means of establishing job security, particularly 
when the threat of losing one’s job is high. The supposed job 
security involves the likelihood of a stand-alone retaliation 
claim, which is the natural outgrowth of such a complaint.
On a more practical level, compared to discrimination, 
retaliation is easier for employees to identify, juries to under-
stand, and lawyers to get interested in. Discrimination can be 
subtle. Employees may wonder whether the employer is bas-
ing a decision on the employee’s protected class or because 
of a personal dislike or other non-discriminatory reason. Re-
taliation, by definition, follows a complaint or another clear 
action, and the employee consequently feels confident in 
the reason for adverse treatment. In addition, lawyers report 
that juries are often skeptical about discrimination. Without 
the “smoking gun” of a specific action or pattern, it is often 
difficult to convince a jury that the employer’s negative feel-
ings about a protected class were so strong that the employer 
was willing to take a discriminatory action and thereby risk 
the time, money, and negative publicity associated with a 
discrimination lawsuit. Alternatively, people understand that 
employers may be angry with being accused of discrimina-
tion, whether falsely or fairly. Because it is easy for employees 
to identify and juries to understand, plaintiffs’ lawyers, who 
are rational actors that must decide whether to invest their 
time and money in each case with which they are presented, 
are often more interested in retaliation cases than other 
types of discrimination cases. A case where the employee 
can identify unlawful actions based on an easily understand-
able unlawful motivation is attractive to such a jury member. 
Finally, as explained below, retaliation cases are simply easier 
to prove than traditional discrimination cases.
32.38 percent. Retaliation claims now account for more than 
a quarter of the EEOC’s docket. In fact, unlike any other cat-
egory, retaliation’s percentages did not rise and fall through-
out the time period in question. Instead, except for a slight 
drop from 2001 to 2002 (27.5% to 27.0%), retaliation cases, 
as a percentage of total cases filed, rose each year. 
We need to point out that the increase in the percent-
age of retaliation cases does not, however, reflect a decrease 
in the percentages of other cases. The reason for this is that 
the percentages add up to more than 100, because one indi-
vidual can allege discrimination under more than one cause. 
For example, assume that a forty-five year old, African-
American woman, who is Jewish and blind, files a charge 
against a potential employer who failed to hire her. Based 
on one incident, this individual can allege discrimination 
based on age, race, sex, religion, and disability. Each theory 
of discrimination would be listed in the percentages despite 
the fact that there was only one charge filed. Similarly, the 
percentages of retaliation claims can rise when employees 
tack such claims on to existing allegations. 
There are some data to support this argument. Between 
1997 and 2007 the percentage of “cases” rose from 163.6 
percent to 188.2 percent. In that same time the percentage 
of retaliation cases rose 9.7 percent.3 While there are no data 
to support the position that the increase in the percentage 
of retaliation claims is fueled by “tack-on” cases, we can 
infer some effect, and consequently we believe that this is 
occurring. 
The question is why lawyers and employees are tack-
ing on retaliation claims. The obvious answer is: why not? 
It costs nothing more and it is easy to do in the course of 
attempting to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion. For that to occur, petitioning employees must prove: 
(1) they are in a protected class, (2) they were qualified to 
perform the job in question; (3) they suffered an adverse 
employment action, and (4) there is evidence of discrimina-
tion.4 If the employee ever complained about any perceived 
3 Id.
4 See: Hicks v. St. Mary’s Honor Center, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
Retaliation claims have 
grown steadily in recent 
years, often as a “tack on” to 
discrimination complaints.
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In Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale and Retail Stores,7 the 
Fifth Circuit court addressed the definition of a protected 
expression. Employee Payne believed that his employer 
refused to hire people of color into positions where the 
employees would have to handle money. Payne, who was 
laid off each year during the summer, joined a civil rights 
group that picketed in front of the employer’s store. After the 
picketing occurred, the employer did not rehire Payne, who 
alleged retaliation under the opposition clause. The em-
ployer’s argument that Payne did not engage in a protected 
expression was based on two reasons. First, the employer 
argued that Payne’s allegations of racial discrimination 
were unfounded, and thus there could not be a protected 
expression. In essence, the employer asserted that employees 
cannot succeed on a retaliation claim unless they prove that 
the underlying claim of employment discrimination did, in 
fact, occur. Second, the employer argued that even if this 
was not the case, Payne did not engage in a protected expres-
sion because picketing is not protected by the retaliation law. 
The court addressed the first issue fully, but did not really 
address the second.
Rejecting the employer’s first claim, the court held that 
the employee engaged in a protected expression even if the 
underlying claim failed and the employer had not, in fact, 
violated the law. Instead, the court held that employee only 
needed to have a “good faith, reasonable belief ” that the 
subject of the complaint was true. Looking at why the court 
made this ruling, we must examine what constitutes a good 
faith, reasonable belief. 
The reason for not requiring a plaintiff to prove that the 
truth of the underlying claim is that it prevents the chilling 
effect of possible dismissal for speaking up. If employees 
are protected only when they can prove that their employer 
violated the law, employees will be reluctant to use company 
harassment policies or otherwise complain about discrimi-
nation. Since the Supreme Court, numerous other courts, 
law review articles, and commentators all contend that 
the key to ending discrimination is employee complaints 
followed by swift employer action, the chilling effect needs 
to be avoided. That does not mean, however, that the good 
faith, reasonable belief standard is not fraught with prob-
lems. For the sake of argument, what if Payne’s allegation 
was false, even though Payne believed it to be true? 
Say that the employer in Payne offered the money-re-
lated job in question to its two most senior employees, both 
of whom were individuals of color. Say that each of those 
employees turned the employer down. The employer was 
disappointed, but believed it was the employees’ decision to 
make and thus offered the position to the third most senior 
employee, a white employee who accepted the job. Payne, 
7 654 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1981).
The Law of Retaliation
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, retaliation 
claims can arise out of the statute’s participation or op-
position clause. Retaliation under the participation clause 
occurs when the employee participates in a Title VII case 
(or the necessary precursors, such as EEOC investigations). 
Retaliation under the opposition clause law occurs when an 
employee “opposes” a perceived Title VII violation. To estab-
lish a case under either clause, employees must prove that: 
(1) they engaged in a “protected expression;” (2) they were 
discriminated against, and (3) there is a link between the 
protected expression and the adverse employment action.5 
Each element of the claim is the subject of significant case 
law, commentary and confusion. In fact, both Crawford and 
White address elements of the prima facie case. Crawford 
addresses the parameters of the opposition clause. In White, 
the Supreme Court defined the term “discrimination.” As 
with many cases, both White and Crawford provided some 
answers, but left a number of issues open. While these cases 
may seem innocuous, the “losing side,” in this case manage-
ment, followed the typical pattern of reaction to a Supreme 
Court decision by crying that the sky is falling, a cry echoed 
by the management bar.6 
As we explain below, like Chicken Little, commenta-
tors who see doom for employers based on these cases have 
greatly exaggerated their effects. To support this contention, 
we first explain protected expression and the Crawford effect. 
We then explain “discrimination” and the White effect.  
A protected expression, for our purpose here, occurs 
when an employee complains that the employer is violat-
ing a discrimination law. This type of complaint can occur 
under either the participation or the opposition clause. An 
employee invokes the participation clause when he or she 
takes part (e.g., as a party or witness) in a Title VII, ADEA, 
or ADA proceeding (e.g., agency investigation or litigation). 
The opposition clause applies to situations where the em-
ployee’s complaint did not come as part of a discrimination 
proceeding and is, instead, based on an internal complaint 
or other notification to management. Regardless of which 
applies, it is important to note that the discrimination at is-
sue does not have to involve the complaining employee. For 
example, a male employee who testifies at trial or complains 
to the company that women are being sexually harassed has 
engaged in a protected expression under the participation 
or opposition clause. The question, however, remains: what 
exactly constitutes a protected expression?
5 See: Gonzalez v. Ingersoll Milling Mach., 133 F.3d 1025  
6 The “sky is falling” response is not limited to employers, the plaintiffs’ 
bar reacts the same way when management prevails.
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jurisdictions protect a complaint based on a single inci-
dent.10 Last, at least one court declined to rule on the issue, 
but held that such an expression was protected because 
the employer’s HR director made it clear that such conduct 
was against policy and could be unlawful. Thus, good faith, 
reasonable belief is a defense for employers and a hurdle 
for employees to clear in opposition-clause cases. It is 
not however, an issue in participation-clause cases, as we 
explain next.
As we said, the majority of courts hold that the par-
ticipation clause protects an employee who participates 
in any Title VII procedure regardless of the extent of such 
participation.11 In fact, the EEOC guidelines state that 
the protection under the participation clause applies to 
testifying, assisting, and preparing affidavits in conjunction 
with a proceeding or investigation under Title VII, ADEA, 
ADA, or EPA. In other words, an employee who files an 
EEOC charge or who assists another in filing or preparing 
such a charge is now in a protected class. This is the case 
even if the charge is not true, not reasonable, or not even 
good faith. As the Second Circuit court in Deravin v. Kerik 
stated,12 the participation clause: “is expansive and seem-
ingly contains no limits.” No case illustrates this point better 
than Merritt v. Dillard Paper Company,13 where the Elev-
enth Circuit court held that a company could not discharge 
an employee for his admitted sexual harassment when the 
admission occurred during Title VII testimony. Because a 
protected expression under the participation clause need 
not satisfy the good faith, reasonable belief standard, plain-
tiffs’ lawyers often seek to fit their cases into this clause. 
In Crawford the plaintiff was questioned as part of an 
internal sexual harassment complaint brought by another 
employee. Specifically, a human resource officer of the 
employer asked the plaintiff if she had ever witnessed any 
“inappropriate behavior” on the part of one Dr. Hughes, 
the school district’s employee relations director. Crawford 
responded by stating that in response to her asking Dr. 
Hughes, “What’s up,” he grabbed his crotch and said, “You 
know what’s up.” Crawford also stated that Dr. Hughes re-
peatedly put his crotch up to plaintiff ’s window and, on one 
occasion, entered plaintiff ’s office, grabbed her head and 
pulled it towards his own crotch.
The organization did not discipline the alleged harasser, 
but soon after it concluded its investigation, the company 
terminated Crawford for embezzlement. Crawford argued 
10  Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 195 (7th Cir. 1994).
11 The minority position requires the plaintiff to hold a good-faith belief 
that the employer violated the law.  See Ficus v. Triumph Group Opera-
tions, Inc., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1229 (D. Kan. 1998)
12 335 F.3d 203-205 (2nd Cir. 2003)
13 120 F.3d 1181 (11th Cir. 1997)
however, had no way of knowing how the hiring decision 
was made. Instead, Payne observed no people of color in 
positions where the employee handles money, and jumped 
to a logical, albeit erroneous conclusion: namely, that the 
two most senior employees, both of whom were African-
American, were passed over for the open position in favor of 
a white employee. Payne notifies the company and the EEOC 
of his belief that the employer violated the law (thus activat-
ing the participation clause). The EEOC investigates, and 
soon the local newspaper and publishes a front-page story 
about the investigation. A protest ensues outside the employ-
er’s front door, and people hold signs accusing the employer 
of being a racist. The employer’s business suffers, the owners’ 
standing in the community is diminished, and the owners’ 
families are being verbally attacked due to this false accusa-
tion. Furious at being maligned, the owners do not wish to 
continue to employ the individual whose false accusations 
caused all of this pain and suffering. The owners want to ter-
minate the employee, but the company lawyers advise against 
that course because the company cannot successfully argue 
that it should not have to employ this individual. The only 
thing the company can do is focus on the “good faith, reason-
able belief ” aspect of the law. 
An expression is considered to be in good faith if the 
employee truly believed that the alleged conduct occurred. 
An employee has a reasonable belief if (1) there is a basis to 
believe that the alleged conduct did occur; and (2) if true, the 
conduct would violate the law. The second element is often 
the key in an employer’s attempt to have the case dismissed. 
Employees often file retaliation cases based on their incorrect 
understanding of the law. For example, say that an employee 
believes that sexual orientation is protected by federal law 
and complains that the employer is harassing employees 
based on their sexual orientation. The employer terminates 
the employee, and the employee files a retaliation claim. 
Sexual orientation; however, is not protected by federal law. 
Thus, even if the employee’s actions were in good faith, they 
were not reasonable because the employer’s actions, if true, 
would not violate the law.8 A more difficult case occurs when 
an employee is subjected to a single sexist or racist comment. 
The law is clear that a single remark will not constitute harass-
ment. Thus, one could argue that a complaint based on single 
comment could not create a “reasonable belief ” for the pur-
poses of protected expression under the retaliation doctrine. 
This issue, however, has created a split in the circuits. 
Some courts contend that since the conduct, if true, could 
not sustain a claim, the expression is not protected.9 Other 
courts recognize that complaining before the conduct rises to 
the level of being unlawful should be encouraged, and those 
8 Jordan v. Alternative Res. Corp., 458 F.3d 332  (4th Cir. 2006).
9 Id.
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that she was terminated in retaliation for cooperating with 
the company’s internal investigation. The company con-
tended that the employee never engaged in a protected 
expression because: (1) she did not assertively oppose the 
harassment; she merely answered questions by investigators; 
and (2) she did not participate in an EEOC investigation or 
in litigation. Both the district and circuit courts dismissed 
the case, holding that to invoke the opposition clause the 
employee must instigate or initiate the complaint. Moreover 
the participation clause did not apply because this was sim-
ply an internal investigation. The Court had a variety of ways 
to address this case. It could: (1) redefine the opposition 
clause; (2) redefine the participation clause; or (3) as it did 
in Ellerth, redefine both clauses and develop a system that 
would prevent lawyers from trying to fit their cases into the 
most plaintiff-friendly classification.14 The Court redefined 
the opposition clause. 
In defining the opposition clause, the Crawford Court, 
as all courts must do, first looked to the statutory language. 
The statute states: “the opposition clause makes it unlaw-
ful…for an employer to discriminate against any employee 
because he has opposed any practice made…unlawful…by 
this subchapter.” This language does not, however, define the 
term “oppose.” The Court addressed this fact by citing Perrin 
v. United States15 stating: “The term “oppose,” being left un-
defined by the statue, carries with its ordinary meaning…to 
resist or antagonize…; to contend against; to confront; resist; 
withstand.” With a definition in hand, the Court could now 
apply the facts to the law. 
The question for the Court was whether the plaintiff ’s 
answers to the questions posed by the human resource of-
ficer met the Court’s definition of “oppose.” The Court held 
that these answers did constitute opposition because the 
14 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, 123 F.3d 490. In Ellerth the ques-
tion before the court was whether certain conduct was either quid pro quo 
sexual harassment or hostile environment. At the time, employers were 
always liable for quid pro quo, but were liable for hostile environment 
only if the company knew or should have known about the harassment. 
The Court rejected the distinction and set a new standard for liablity in 
sexual harassment.
15 44 U.S. 37 (1979).
plaintiff gave an: “ostensibly disapproving account of sexu-
ally obnoxious behavior.” According to the Court, “Craw-
ford’s description of the louche goings-on would certainly 
qualify in the minds of reasonable jurors as resist[ant] or 
antagoni[stic] to Hughes.” At first blush, this holding does 
not seem especially problematic. An employee who re-
sponds to a question about the existence of reprehensible 
behavior by giving an account of said behavior is protected 
as if she had complained initially. There are, however, two 
problems with this holding from an employer’s perspective: 
(1) did the court expand the definition of the opposition 
clause?; and (2) how does an employee separate the oppos-
ing employer from the co-conspirator?
One can argue that the Court’s holding expanded the 
definition of the term “oppose” to include passive conduct. 
For example, the Court stated that “countless people were 
known to oppose slavery before Emancipation…without 
writing public letters, taking to the streets, or resisting the 
government.” Furthermore, the Court stated that a supervi-
sor who refused to terminate an employee in violation of 
Title VII had opposed an unlawful practice. While these 
statements are dicta,16 and not the holding of the case, they 
are cause for concern. Can an employer be liable for retalia-
tion against an employee whom the employer did not know 
had opposed an unlawful practice? If so, this case could 
be an employer’s worst nightmare. However, close analysis 
reveals that employers need not despair.
First, in his concurrence, Justice Alito states that this 
case does not hold that employees are protected even where 
these employees do not openly express their opposition to 
an allegedly unlawful practice. Instead, Alito rightly states 
that the Court has not addressed this issue. Second, it is also 
well-settled law that vague complaints will not constitute a 
protected expression. For example there are numerous cases 
where employees failed to satisfy their burden because of 
lack of specificity. In fact, employees failed to make a claim, 
in the following three instances: (1) in a sex case the em-
16 Dicta is language in a judicial opinion that may explain the holding, 
but is not the holding of the case. While courts may rely on dicta, they are 
not bound by such comments.
An employer cannot be 
liable for retaliation if it did 
not know that the employee 
engaged in a protected 
expression. 
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tion against employees. Thus, it is not unlawful to terminate 
someone for engaging in unacceptable behavior. This is the 
case even if the employee is not a co-conspirator, but has 
“opposed” in an unclear or unacceptable manner.
For example, in Cruz v. Coach Stores, Inc., 22 the 
employee slapped her co-worker in the face after he made 
extremely inappropriate sexual remarks. The harasser then 
put the employee in a head lock. The employer lawfully 
terminated both employees. Similarly, employees were not 
protected when they: (1) called a discriminating supervisor 
incompetent and a political hack;23 (2) opposed perceived 
discrimination by engaging in workplace confrontations that 
caused disruption;24 and (3) took confidential files to support 
a discrimination claim.25 In addition, employees were not 
protected when they picketed the employer’s workplace and 
threatened the employer’s well being.
Commentary on Crawford will likely be to the effect 
that retaliation is now an easier claim to file. In fact, there 
are already several post-Crawford cases that could be read to 
support this proposition. For example, in Demers v. Adams 
House of Northwestern Florida,26 the plaintiff was denied 
a requested a maternity leave. In denying the leave, the 
plaintiff ’s supervisor explained that her boss, Malone, the 
regional manager, stated that the problem with pregnant 
women is that you did not know whether they would return. 
Plaintiff stated she would discuss this with Malone. The 
Court held that in the Eleventh Circuit asking for a leave is 
not a protected expression, but accepted the plaintiff ’s argu-
ment that her statement that she would discuss the denial 
and the rationale behind it with Malone constituted a pro-
tected expression. In Riscili v. Gibson Guitar27 the plaintiff, an 
openly gay man, was told that a supervisor was mocking the 
plaintiff by standing behind him and making exaggerated 
motions as plaintiff was carrying on a conversation. The next 
day the plaintiff received a phone call from another supervi-
sor who wished to discuss the incident. Plaintiff stated that 
he would handle it. When plaintiff later filed a retaliation 
lawsuit the company argued that there was no protected 
expression. Again, the court held that despite the lack of a 
formal complaint, the plaintiff made his objection clear to 
the employer.
Both of these cases support our contention that while 
Crawford defined the opposition clause and may have even 
expanded its definition, there is no real effect for employers. 
Despite the Eleventh Circuit’s case law, we would never rec-
22 202 F.3d 997 (7th Cir. 2000).
23 Miller v. AM. Familey Mut. Ins. Co., 203 F. 3d 1253.
24 Matima v. Celli, 228 F.3d 68 (2nd Cir. 2000).
25 Niswander v. Cincinnati Ins., Co., 2007 WL 1189350 (N.D. Ohio 2007).
26 2009 US App. Lexis 5844 (11th Cir. 2009).
27 605 F.supp. 2nd 558 (SD NY 2009).
ployee claimed to be picked on but did not state a reason;17 
(2) where the employee’s letter of complaint about manage-
ment did not use the words sex or gender and instead stated 
that all members of the faculty were mistreated;18 and (3) 
in a race case where the employee complained of a “good ol’ 
boy” atmosphere.19 Because these cases do not conflict with 
Crawford, they are still good law and should not be affected 
by the new holding. 
Finally, it is clear that an employer cannot be liable for 
retaliation if it did not know that the employee engaged in a 
protected expression. Thus, an employee who never com-
municates opposition would not be protected. Employers 
should find comfort in this fact, as there is a long history of 
employees found to have engaged in protected expressions 
that were not the traditional complaints to management or 
to the EEOC. For example, in Worth v. Tyer,20 the Seventh 
Circuit held that an employee’s police report alleging that 
the company’s main decision maker touched the employee’s 
breast while she was in her office constituted a protected ex-
pression. Similarly, a complaint made by woman to a fellow 
employee about sexual harassment was classified as a pro-
tected expression after the accused found out and threatened 
to get even.21 The rarity of such cases is due to the difficulty 
in proving that the employer knew of the complaint and 
took an employment action based on it.
Trying to assess whether the “opposing” employee was 
really in opposition or was a co-conspirator is an outgrowth 
of Crawford, but is not something that should cause concern. 
An employee who complains is clearly opposing. Conversely, 
an employee who responds to a question may or may not be 
in opposition to the conduct. For instance, the plaintiff in 
Crawford responded to Hughes’s comments by telling him 
to: “bite me” and “flipping him a bird.” The employer argued 
that the plaintiff was not opposing because she was taking 
part in the objectionable behavior. The Court held that this 
was a factual question for the jury. While a factual question 
for the jury often means huge attorneys’ fees for employers, 
this holding is not that problematic. Employers can solve 
this issue by asking the employees how they felt about the 
conduct and why they did not complain. In addition, the 
employer needs to investigate the interaction fully and 
interview any individual with knowledge of the employees’ 
conduct. An employer who determines that the employee 
was participating in the harassment, rather than opposing it, 
cannot be liable. The law requires intent to establish retalia-
17 Sitar v. Ind. Dep’t of Transportation, 344 F3d 720 (7th Cir. 2003).
18 Albrechtsen v. Brd of Regents, 309 F. 3d 433 (7th Cir. 2002).
19 Pool v. VanRheen, 297 F. #d 889 (9th Cir. 2002).
20 276 F.3d. 249 (7th Cir. 2001).
21 See: O’Neal v. Ferguson Construction Co., 237 F.3d 1248 (10th Cir. 
2001).
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ommend firing a woman who was denied a maternity leave. 
Similarly, even prior to Crawford we would have considered 
someone who was mocked because of their protected class28 
as having engaged in a protected expression regardless of 
whether they formally complained or contended they would 
address the situation privately. Courts have long protected 
employees who complained of disorderly conduct through 
a variety of avenues, Crawford simply codified this type of 
holding. Moreover, the potential problems associated with 
Crawford can be mitigated with documentation and sound 
legal advice regarding questions and actions that occur dur-
ing a sexual harassment investigation. 
Finally, we believe that Crawford could have been far 
worse from the employer’s standpoint. As stated above, 
under the participation clause the employee need not have a 
good faith, reasonable belief that the employer violated a dis-
crimination law. The Crawford Court could have expanded 
the participation clause to include internal company com-
plaints. If that had been the case, employees on the verge 
of losing their jobs could have been protected and ensured 
their jobs by knowingly making frivolous complaints of 
discrimination. Because the Crawford Court did not address 
the limits of the participation clause, it is still an open ques-
tion as to whether the participation clause covers internal 
company complaints. Employers should check the law in 
their jurisdictions to see whether their circuit has weighed 
in on the issue. We believe that absent circuit law to the con-
trary, federal courts will analyze internal complaints under 
the Crawford standard and not the participation clause.
White Expanded the Meaning of Discrimination 
The second element of any retaliation case is proving that 
the employee was discriminated against. The term “discrimi-
nated” had created a split among the circuits. The Fifth and 
Eight Circuits held that the term discrimination meant that 
the employee suffered some “ultimate” employment decision, 
like a failure to be hired or a termination of employment. On 
the other hand, the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits held 
that the alleged retaliation must simply yield an adverse ef-
fect on the terms, conditions, or benefits of employment. 
In White, the company hired Sheila White, a “track 
laborer,” with Gang 321 in the Maintenance of Way Depart-
ment at its Tennessee Yard. The job was not a glamorous one; 
it entailed track replacement and removal, transportation of 
materials, cutting brush, and clearing litter and cargo spills. 
White, however, had experience working a forklift, which led 
Burlington Northern’s road master, Marvin Brown, to assign 
her to forklift duty shortly after her arrival. This became 
White’s primary responsibility, even though she continued to 
perform some track laborer tasks. 
28 Sexual orientation is protected in New York State.
Three months into the job, White complained to Brown 
about the sexual harassment White experienced at the hands 
of her immediate supervisor, Bill Joiner. She complained that 
Joiner would tell White, the only female member of Gang 
321, that the railroad was no place for women to work. After 
an internal investigation, Brown informed White that Joiner 
had been suspended for ten days and ordered to attend a 
sexual harassment training session. At the same time, Brown 
relieved White of her forklift duties, explaining that a “more 
senior man” should have the “less arduous and cleaner job,” 
according to the terms of their collective bargaining agree-
ment. Apparently, her coworkers had also complained about 
her assignment. 
In the months that followed, White filed three retalia-
tion charges with the EEOC. Each alleged that, in response 
to White’s harassment and discrimination complaints, 
Brown subjected her to adverse actions. First, he removed 
White from the forklift. He then placed her “under surveil-
lance” and monitored her daily activities. Finally, Brown 
suspended White, allegedly for insubordination, during the 
Christmas season after she had a disagreement with another 
supervisor. The company later determined, through its inter-
nal grievance procedures, that White had not been insubor-
dinate and awarded her back pay for thirty-seven days. 
White eventually filed a Title VII action in federal court 
after exhausting her administrative remedies.29 A jury found 
in White’s favor and awarded her $43,500 in damages. The 
district court then denied Burlington’s post-trial motion for 
judgment as a matter of law on the retaliation claims. On 
appeal, a divided Sixth Circuit panel reversed that judg-
ment, but the full Court of Appeals subsequently vacated the 
panel’s decision and affirmed the district court, with each 
of the judges voting to uphold the initial judgment. They 
disagreed, however, as to what standard to apply in address-
ing the issue of discrimination. 
In December 2005, the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve the aforementioned circuit split on the 
adverse action issue. To do so, the Court had to decide two 
things: (1) does the law only forbid those retaliatory actions 
that are related to employment or the workplace?; and (2) 
how harmful must a retaliatory action be to subsequently 
fall within the provision’s scope?
On the first question, Burlington and the Solicitor 
General, as amicus curiae, argued in favor of the standard 
requiring a link between the adverse action and the terms, 
conditions, or status of employment. They contended that 
Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision should be read in pari 
materia with the anti-discrimination provision, which only 
protects an individual from employment-related discrimina-
tion. Justice Breyer, writing the majority opinion, disagreed 
29 Administrative remedies refer to filing with the EEOC or a state agency.
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ployee from complaining about discrimination and would 
therefore be unlawful.
Applying the new standard to White’s case, the major-
ity concluded that there was a sufficient evidentiary basis 
to support the jury’s verdict on her retaliation claims. It 
rejected Burlington’s contention that the reassignment could 
not constitute retaliation where the former and present 
job duties fall within the same job description. It likewise 
rejected Burlington’s argument that the suspension could not 
constitute retaliation because White was ultimately reinstat-
ed with back pay. The majority determined in both instances 
that a reasonable employee—having to choose between the 
loss of a paycheck near Christmas or relegation to less desir-
able tasks and withholding a discrimination complaint—
might well have taken the latter route. 
Justice Alito concurred in the Supreme Court’s judg-
ment, but disagreed with the majority’s interpretation of 
§704(a).30 In his view, the new standard had no basis in the 
statutory language and would only lead to practical prob-
lems and perverse results. He criticized the majority test 
where it implied an inverse relationship between the severity 
of the original act of discrimination that prompted the retali-
ation and the degree of protection afforded to the victim. He 
believed a victim of severe discrimination would not easily 
be dissuaded from filing a charge, whereas a victim of much 
milder discrimination would be dissuaded on account of the 
costs involved. Justice Alito also faulted the majority’s con-
ception of a “reasonable worker” and its use of a “loose and 
unfamiliar” causation standard. In short, he would have read 
§§703(a) and 704(a) together and required an adverse effect 
on the “terms, conditions, or benefits of employment.”31
Predictably, the plaintiffs’ bar declared victory and the 
management bar whined that the sky had fallen. Unlike 
Crawford, there has been sufficient time to examine the 
effects of White v. Burlington Northern. Below we state that 
while some courts have relied on the new holding as a basis 
for pro-employee decisions, the sky has not fallen and the 
effect of the case is limited.
Few Pro-Employer Decisions in the Wake of 
White 
To be sure, a number of courts have explicitly recognized 
that White expanded the scope of adverse actions in Title 
VII retaliation claims.32 Courts have likewise reversed prior 
judgments, specifying that acts once deemed insufficient to 
satisfy the second prima facie element are now actionable. 
30 Justice Alito took his seat on the bench on Jan. 31, 2006; the Court 
decided White less than five months later on June 22, 2006.
31 Id. at 2422.
32 See, e.g.: Michael, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18154, at 17; Hare, 220 Fed. 
Appx. at 127 n.4; Brockman, 217 Fed. Appx. at 206 n.3; McCullough v. 
Kirkum, 212 Fed. Appx. 281, 285 (5th Cir. 2006). 
in light of the linguistic differences between the different 
sections of the law. He then shifted the Court’s inquiry from 
whether the two provisions should be construed together to 
whether Congress intended the variations to make a legal 
difference. Justice Breyer also noted the presumption that 
Congress acts “intentionally and purposely” in its disparate 
inclusions and exclusions. 
The White majority first observed that the substantive 
provision and anti-retaliation provision seek different things. 
One aims to prevent injury to individuals based on who they 
are (i.e., substantive differences such as sex or race). The oth-
er aims to prevent harm to individuals based on what they 
do (i.e., their conduct). The court then remarked that the 
substantive provision’s basic objectives would be achieved if 
all employment-related discrimination miraculously ended, 
while the anti-retaliation’s objectives would not. Because 
an employer can take retaliatory action not directly related 
to employment, or cause harm outside the workplace, the 
majority voiced its concern for the act’s enforcement—or 
lack thereof—under a strict regime. It reasoned that a broad 
interpretation of §704(a) would help to assure the coopera-
tion of employees in filing complaints and acting as witness-
es, whereas a limited construction would fail to maintain 
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms.” The 
majority concluded—in no uncertain terms—that Title VII’s 
substantive and anti-retaliation provisions are not cotermi-
nous, and therefore the latter cannot be read to only cover 
retaliatory acts related to employment. 
The Supreme Court then turned its attention to the 
level of harm needed to make an instance of retaliation 
actionable. The majority held that “a plaintiff must show that 
a reasonable employee would have found the challenged 
action materially adverse, which in the context means it well 
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making 
or supporting a charge of discrimination.” In adopting this 
standard set forth by the Seventh and D.C. Circuits, the 
majority highlighted three aspects: materiality, reasonable-
ness, and context. It spoke of material adversity since “petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” 
will normally not deter an employee from relying on Title 
VII’s remedial mechanisms. It spoke of a reasonable employ-
ee because the standard for judging harm must be objective 
to avoid a plaintiff ’s “unusual subjective feelings.” Finally, the 
majority phrased the standard in general terms because “the 
significance of any given act of retaliation will often depend 
upon the particular circumstances.” To illustrate, the major-
ity noted that a supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to 
lunch is normally a trivial, non-actionable slight. To retaliate, 
however, by excluding the same employee from a weekly 
training lunch that “contributes significantly” to his or her 
professional advancement might well deter a reasonable em-
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For example, in Walsh v. Irvin Stern’s Costumes,33 the defen-
dant allegedly threatened to accuse the plaintiff of a crime 
and seek criminal charges against her unless she withdrew 
her discrimination complaint. The court initially dismissed 
the plaintiff ’s retaliation claims because the defendant’s 
actions “did not adequately bear a nexus” to her employ-
ment. After White, however, the court reinstated the claims, 
noting that White specifically abrogated the Third Circuit’s 
restrictive standard and that a threat to accuse the plaintiff of 
a criminal offense could “certainly be construed as ‘materi-
ally adverse’ to her.” Similarly, in Hare v. Potter34 the Third 
Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and accepted 
the plaintiff ’s argument that exclusion from a career man-
agement program that was “designed to train and fast-track 
employees with leadership skills into management-level po-
sitions” would dissuade a reasonable employee from making 
a charge of discrimination.
These two holdings are prime examples of cases that 
were dismissed prior to White, but were now viable. One 
could look at these cases as prime examples of the major 
effects of White and conclude that the case changed the legal 
landscape of retaliation law. Alternatively, one can see two 
cases that, even prior to White, could likely give rise to retali-
ation claims. Moreover, we contend that these two situations 
are the types of actions that employers should be liable for. 
Making it unlawful to respond to an accusation of sexual 
harassment by threatening to arrest employees or to exclude 
an employee from a training program is a reasonable legal 
conclusion regardless of the precise parameters of the “ad-
verse action.” This does not mean, however, that White did 
not give employers cause for concern. Employers were con-
cerned that the other elements of the prima facie case would 
become easier to prove and that standard practices like per-
formance improvement plans, the proverbial “cold shoulder,” 
and other seemingly minor actions would suddenly become 
actionable. However, such has not been the case. 
33 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57398, at 6-7 (E.D. Penn. 2006).
34 220 Fed. Appx. 120, 128 (3d Cir. 2007)
But the Sky Is Not Falling
The first-generation of post-White results include a wide-
spread rejection of misguided attempts by plaintiffs to 
liberalize the prima facie case. Courts have firmly rejected 
change in analysis for the protected activity and causation 
elements of the prima facie case.35 Courts have also declined 
to categorize the “ordinary tribulations of the workplace” as 
adverse actions, notwithstanding §704(a)’s expanded cover-
age of acts unrelated to employment.36 
In rejecting a number of post-White cases, courts have 
focused on the other elements of the prima facie case in one 
of two ways. First, some courts do not examine the second 
element of the prima facie case where the plaintiff fails to sat-
isfy the first element, namely, that the plaintiffs engaged in 
protected activity.37 For example, in DeHar v. Baker Hughes 
Oilfield Operationist, the plaintiff argued that because she 
was “closely related to or associated with” another black em-
ployee, she could share in his protected activity (a charged 
filed with, but later dismissed by the EEOC). She also alleged 
that a denial of sick leave and the opening of an “investiga-
tive file” amounted to an adverse action under Title VII. The 
Fifth Circuit concluded that it did not need to address the 
sufficiency of these challenged actions because, as a matter 
of law, the plaintiff could not claim the protected activity as 
her own. 
The second approach courts used in the post-White 
world was to assume that the challenged acts do constitute 
adverse actions under White, but to deny plaintiffs’ claims 
because they failed to prove the third element—causation.38 
35 See, e.g., Dean v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
16911, at 18 (E.D. Penn. 2007); Rodriguez v. Union Pac. Corp., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 57011, at 3 (D. Neb. 2006). 
36 See, e.g., Nugent v. St. Luke’s/Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28274, at 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); Simmons v. Boeing Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 65527, at 39-40 (M.D. Ga. 2006).
37 See: DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc., 214 Fed. Appx. 
437, 441 (5th Cir. 2007); Nicholls v. Brookdale Univ. Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 
205 Fed. Appx. 858, 861 (2d Cir. 2006). 
38 See, e.g.: Devin v. Schwan’s Home Servs., Inc., 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16017, at 17 (8th Cir. 2007); McLaurin v. City of Jackson Fire Dep’t, 217 
Fed. Appx. 287, 288 (5th Cir. 2006). 
By themselves, the petty 
annoyances of the workplace 
do not automatically constitute 
discrimination or retaliation.
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In Devin, for example, the plaintiff deliverywoman was not 
assigned a “route builder,” who should have accompanied 
her on her route and obtained new business by soliciting 
the homes of non-customers. The plaintiff argued that this 
failure constituted an adverse action in retaliation for her 
complaints about disparate treatment. While the Eighth Cir-
cuit first noted the limited record on the value of such help, 
it rejected the plaintiff ’s retaliation claim on the ground that 
no inference of a causal connection could be drawn between 
the arguably adverse action and the plaintiff ’s complaints to 
the human resources director. 39 
Focusing on other elements of the prima facie course 
allows courts to sidestep the true holding of White and to 
avoid analyzing the Supreme Court’s new interpretation. 
This resulted because plaintiffs, apparently encouraged by 
the prospect of White opening the floodgates to expanded 
claims, filed claims where the “discrimination” at issue 
pushed the limits of the Court’s new relaxed standard. The 
initial holdings of the courts show a consistent pattern: 
(1) employees fail to appreciate that while the standard is 
relaxed, they still must prove that they suffered “material 
adversity”; and (2) courts will not turn normal workplace 
interactions into actionable discrimination. Instead, courts 
continually cite the Supreme Court’s direction to “separate 
significant from trivial harms” in the discussion of each 
case.40 In Nugent, the plaintiff social worker complained 
about her supervisor’s sexist and denigrating comments. The 
plaintiff was then reprimanded for failing to process patient 
discharge forms, arriving late for work, and skipping a meet-
ing to go Christmas shopping. The plaintiff then retired (to 
preempt termination) and filed suit, alleging “nasty looks” 
and “angry silences” as alleged discrimination at work. The 
district court quickly dismissed such her claims, holding 
that, “without more, [these] are not materially adverse 
actions.” In Juarez, the female plaintiff, a Hispanic dental 
assistant, complained that a dentist propositioned her for 
sex during a business trip. Thereafter, several coworkers 
pulled away and began to treat her coldly. While the court 
39 Other courts have used an a fortiori approach—stating that the second 
element is not at issue since the challenged acts previously satisfied one 
of the more restrictive standards. See, e.g., Grother v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77044, at 10 (S.D. Tex. 2006); Rodriguez, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 57011, at 4. These courts have likewise rejected the plaintiffs’ 
argument where they have failed to prove a causal connection between 
the protected activity and the alleged retaliation. In Grother, for example, 
the plaintiff moved for reconsideration of his retaliation claims after the 
Supreme Court decided White. 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77044, at 8. How-
ever, the district court accepted his negative performance evaluation as an 
adverse action in its original memorandum and opinion, and thereafter 
did not reexamine the matter. See id. at 10-11. 
40 White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415; see, e.g., Nugent, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28274, at 30; Juarez v. Utah Dep’t of Health, 2006 U.D. Dist. LEXIS 69005, 
at 40-41 (D. Utah 2006); Billings v. Town of Grafton, 441 F. Supp. 2d 227 
(D. Mass. 2006). 
conceded that it was “no doubt unpleasant for [the plaintiff] 
to face snide comments and the cold shoulder,” it concluded 
that these minor annoyances were not actionable under Title 
VII and the White standard. In Billings, the female plaintiff 
worked as a secretary for the town administrator, who alleg-
edly stared at her breasts with some regularity. After making 
various sexual harassment complaints and filing suit, the 
plaintiff continued to work with the administrator despite 
his cold-shoulder treatment. The court perceived this as a 
“normal response to a naturally awkward situation, [and] not 
a material adverse action.” It further commented, “It is un-
realistic to think, even under the best of circumstances, that 
parties on the opposite sides of litigation would not interact 
with each other somewhat more formally or stiffly.” 
Of course, to read White as a categorical rejection of all 
retaliation claims based in part on cold-shoulder treatment 
would be careless and inaccurate. The majority stressed 
the importance of context in analyzing whether challenged 
actions cross the materiality threshold. One must look at 
the “constellation of surrounding circumstances, expecta-
tions, and relationships” to truly grasp the “social impact of 
workplace behavior.”41 Hence, the Court preferred “a legal 
standard that speaks in general terms rather than specific 
prohibited acts.”42
In fact, some courts have recognized the cold shoulder 
as part of a larger list of evils capable, perhaps, of dissuading 
a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge 
of discrimination. For example, in Moss v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 43 three female plaintiffs complained to their general 
manager about sexual advances and unfair treatment from 
their supervisor. The three later filed an EEOC complaint. At 
trial, one of the plaintiffs argued that she suffered an adverse 
action when (1) Wal-Mart allowed the supervisor to prepare 
her “below-average” evaluation despite the fact that he had 
been replaced; (2) management shunned her and singled 
her out from her coworkers following the complaint; (3) 
she did not get a hat received by the rest of her coworkers; 
and (4) her supervisor declined to offer her the additional 
hours offered to other employees. The court first noted that 
any one of these actions, taken alone, would not constitute 
an adverse action. However, in denying Wal-Mart’s motion 
for summary judgment, the court concluded that, taken 
together, these incidents of disparate treatment might have 
dissuaded a reasonable employee from reporting a charge of 
discrimination. The Billings Court,44 by comparison, con-
cluded that incidents accompanying the cold-shoulder treat-
41 White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
42 Id.
43 See, e.g.: Moss v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19057, 
at 38 (E.D. La. 2007). 
44 441 F. Supp. 2d at 241
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ment did not constitute adverse action—whether considered 
individually or as a whole. There, the alleged retaliatory acts 
included: (1) the plaintiff ’s ban on social interaction with 
the selectmen’s assistant during office hours; (2) an order to 
avoid the selectmen’s office; (3) criticism about the plaintiff ’s 
job performance; and (4) a reprimand for opening confiden-
tial mail. 
The Supreme Court reiterated in White that Title VII 
does not set forth “a general civility code for the Ameri-
can workplace.”45 It also proclaimed that §704(a) does not 
protect an individual from all forms of retaliation. The 
lower courts have therefore recognized that certain behavior 
continues to be non-actionable under §704(a) even with the 
adoption of a more lenient standard, including “personality 
conflicts at work that generate antipathy.”46 As a result, we 
have seen an increase in the number of cases in which the 
plaintiffs, perhaps emboldened by a misreading of White, 
fail to convert inconsequential conduct into actionable 
retaliation. In Toland v. Potter,47 a female postal worker who 
witnessed a car accident, asked her supervisor to forward 
an email to other offices highlighting the importance of seat 
belts. The supervisor neither acknowledged the email nor 
passed it on. Around the same time, the supervisor sent out 
an email congratulating several employees who had received 
compliments from postal customers on a call-in radio show. 
The supervisor did not include the plaintiff in the email, 
even though she was one such employee. The plaintiff later 
filed suit, alleging that such omissions were retaliatory in 
nature. The court held, however, that the plaintiff suffered—
at the most—a petty slight or minor annoyance, and that no 
reasonable jury could conclude that the plaintiff satisfied 
White’s standard. In Simmons, the plaintiff alleged retaliation 
based on eighteen separate acts, including her rejection from 
volunteer committees and the deletion of her unread emails 
to management, which followed her various complaints 
about coworkers. The court responded with strong rebuke, 
noting that “every single complaint” the plaintiff made per-
tained to “bickering, personality conflicts,” her “unapproach-
able demeanor,” and her “extreme sensitivity to any negative 
feedback whatsoever.” The court then concluded that the 
plaintiff ’s decision to report what she perceived as discrimi-
natory behavior did not immunize her from the petty slights 
and minor annoyances “that all employees experience at 
work.”
45 Quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 
(1998).
46 See, e.g.: Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 589-90 (8th Cir. 2007)
47 See, e.g.: Toland v. Potter, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42153 (D. Kan. 2007); 
Simmons, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65527. 
Legitimate Warnings and Evaluations Are Not 
Actionable
In Nugent, the plaintiff accused her supervisor of creating 
a retaliatory hostile environment through a “paper trail” 
of written warnings and “intense scrutiny.” The plaintiff, 
however, admitted to committing the infractions for which 
she was warned. She also failed to demonstrate that other 
employees who engaged in similar behavior were not 
disciplined. Therefore, the court concluded that the plaintiff 
did not, as a matter of law, establish a retaliatory hostile 
environment. 
In Michael48 the plaintiff ’s subordinates and immedi-
ate supervisor lodged various complaints against her. The 
department manager then gave the plaintiff an option: she 
could either stay at her current position and be placed on 
a 90-day performance plan or accept a lateral assignment 
to a different position with the same pay and benefits. The 
plaintiff chose the former, claiming later that such discipline 
was actually retaliation for her complaint of racial discrimi-
nation. With specific reference to the more lenient adverse 
action standard of White, the Sixth Circuit determined that 
the plaintiff did establish a prima facie case of retaliation. 
However, it also accepted the defendant’s legitimate, non-re-
taliatory reasons for the discipline, noting that the extensive 
documentation pointed to an “honest belief ” in a “reason-
ably informed” decision to take action. It also highlighted 
the fact that the defendant’s HR department prepared the 
performance plan—not the plaintiff ’s manager. The court 
concluded that the plaintiff, with nothing more than con-
trary assertions, failed to show unlawful retaliation. 
Conclusion
Technically, White and Crawford expanded the definition 
and scope of retaliation, making it easier for plaintiffs to 
file retaliation cases. While there was an expected spike in 
the number of retaliation claims filed after White—and we 
expect another one after Crawford—neither case will cause 
major problems for employers who are cognizant of the law, 
document their actions well, and obtain legal advice when 
dealing with any employee who has made a claim of dis-
crimination. Employers who follow these basic procedures 
will protect themselves from future litigation and can avoid 
the potential pitfalls inherent in any expansion in employees’ 
ability to succeed on legal claims. n
48 See: 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 18154, at 5, 8. 
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